Sabrina Hersi Issa
by Sabrina Hersi Issa
The effectiveness of US-led airstrikes in Syria and Iraq targeting bases, training camps and resource havens for the Islamic State (IS) will be limited until there is a concerted effort to do the difficult work of creating stability, good governance and security through actions, policies and leadership. The question we need to answer – and haven’t in more than a decade of military action in the region – is: after air strikes, how do we eliminate the conditions that lead to extremism?
What we see in the collective strength of IS is the result of years of economic, political and military instability – and its practically unmitigated humanitarian impact – in the Middle East and Horn of Africa. The hardest reality the US and its new set of partners in this latest fight will need to face is that, as usual, there is no clear finish line.
With more than 6 million Syrians displaced by the conflict throughout the region, inadequate humanitarian assistance, minimal security and people vulnerable to the influence of foreign extremist groups, this will be, as one US general described, “Harder than anything we’ve tried to do thus far in Iraq or Afghanistan.”
Failure to engage with the region beyond bombing it or arming it created the very problem that we’re now bombing it and arming it to end. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated before this week’s Security Council meeting on foreign terrorist fighters: This growing phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters is a consequence – not a cause – of the conflict in Syria.
A long period of upheaval and, until recently, unresponsive leadership in Iraq – coupled with outrageous human rights abuses in Syria – have created a hothouse of horrors.
In his announcement for the plan to combat IS with airstrikes, President Obama cited the “successes” in Yemen and Somalia. But they are not exactly success stories: the two states are still mired in war, and one experienced a coup as the capital city fell to rebel forces just days ago. Both situations, however, do make the case for the limits of reactionary military campaigns to combat violent nonstate actors, and both countries lacked strong forces on the ground to capitalise on any military advantage that airstrikes offer.
In the years since the high-stakes, extremely tense months of protest, the international pressure for political reconciliation and good governance has long faded. In that vacuum, extremism is now growing, as human rights abuses and extreme poverty run rampant. US drone strikes against Al Qaeda targets in Yemen – similar to the ones the Obama administration launched this week in Syria– are common. The inevitable result of what Whitaker described in 2011 as “change at the top while preserving the status quo beneath” changed nothing for the better, and came at a tremendous, avoidable cost to Yemenis and security in the region.
Long-term success requires reframing “success”, and an end to the myopic military focus on taking out leaders or physical assets. We must disrupt the status quo of “change at the top” and prevent ourselves from making the same mistakes yet again. We have to focus on the human needs of the civilians caught in the chaos, not just this iteration of chaos-creators, lest we recreate the same problems we’re trying to fix under a different name. THE GUARDIAN
by Sabrina Hersi Issa
The effectiveness of US-led airstrikes in Syria and Iraq targeting bases, training camps and resource havens for the Islamic State (IS) will be limited until there is a concerted effort to do the difficult work of creating stability, good governance and security through actions, policies and leadership. The question we need to answer – and haven’t in more than a decade of military action in the region – is: after air strikes, how do we eliminate the conditions that lead to extremism?
What we see in the collective strength of IS is the result of years of economic, political and military instability – and its practically unmitigated humanitarian impact – in the Middle East and Horn of Africa. The hardest reality the US and its new set of partners in this latest fight will need to face is that, as usual, there is no clear finish line.
With more than 6 million Syrians displaced by the conflict throughout the region, inadequate humanitarian assistance, minimal security and people vulnerable to the influence of foreign extremist groups, this will be, as one US general described, “Harder than anything we’ve tried to do thus far in Iraq or Afghanistan.”
Failure to engage with the region beyond bombing it or arming it created the very problem that we’re now bombing it and arming it to end. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated before this week’s Security Council meeting on foreign terrorist fighters: This growing phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters is a consequence – not a cause – of the conflict in Syria.
A long period of upheaval and, until recently, unresponsive leadership in Iraq – coupled with outrageous human rights abuses in Syria – have created a hothouse of horrors.
In his announcement for the plan to combat IS with airstrikes, President Obama cited the “successes” in Yemen and Somalia. But they are not exactly success stories: the two states are still mired in war, and one experienced a coup as the capital city fell to rebel forces just days ago. Both situations, however, do make the case for the limits of reactionary military campaigns to combat violent nonstate actors, and both countries lacked strong forces on the ground to capitalise on any military advantage that airstrikes offer.
In the years since the high-stakes, extremely tense months of protest, the international pressure for political reconciliation and good governance has long faded. In that vacuum, extremism is now growing, as human rights abuses and extreme poverty run rampant. US drone strikes against Al Qaeda targets in Yemen – similar to the ones the Obama administration launched this week in Syria– are common. The inevitable result of what Whitaker described in 2011 as “change at the top while preserving the status quo beneath” changed nothing for the better, and came at a tremendous, avoidable cost to Yemenis and security in the region.
Long-term success requires reframing “success”, and an end to the myopic military focus on taking out leaders or physical assets. We must disrupt the status quo of “change at the top” and prevent ourselves from making the same mistakes yet again. We have to focus on the human needs of the civilians caught in the chaos, not just this iteration of chaos-creators, lest we recreate the same problems we’re trying to fix under a different name. THE GUARDIAN
