Dr Azmi Bishara
With the Arab peoples rising up in 2011, the region saw different kinds of reactions to Iranian expansion. One of the important factors behind the Arab popular protest movement suffering setbacks was the same factor that helped Iran deal with the predicament brought about by the Arab uprisings, and helped it appear to be on the same side as the international consensus: religious extremism, represented by Salafist jihadism.
The Salafist jihadists reacted to Iranian expansion, which has a sectarian character, with a clear sectarian and ‘takfiri’ discourse, and violence against civilians. Salafist jihadists declared other Islamists as well as secularists, Shias and Sunnis as apostates, opposed democracy and dictatorship equally, and labelled both the regimes and peoples that rose up against them as infidels. Consequently, just as Iran found itself in an alliance with the US against the Taliban, it now finds itself in a similar but more pronounced alliance against the Islamic State group (IS).
Until the rise of the IS and other radical groups, Iranian expansion in the region since 2011 was on the defensive, especially by choosing to side with the dictatorship of Bashar Al Assad as it engages in genocide against the Syrian people, and with the sectarian administration of Nouri Al Maliki in Iraq.
Interestingly, at a time when the US no longer wants to intervene militarily and directly with ground forces, Iran and the militias it supports have become America’s boots on the ground, without whom no aerial bombardment campaign can ever be successful.
In addition to the armies allied to Tehran, and in order to ensure loyalty, Iran created sectarian militias in both Syria and Iraq, and added to that list its proxies in Yemen. These militias report directly to Iran, and not the governments of those countries, even when those governments are themselves subservient.
In an April 5 interview with The New York Times following the Lausanne agreement, Barack Obama asked why the Arab countries had not created ground forces to intervene against radical Islamic groups, and why they had not taken action in Syria against the regime there. Obama had addressed similar questions to Turkey, asking why the nation with the second largest army in Nato was waiting for the US to impose a no-fly zone and why it was not imposing it itself.
In the same interview, Obama recognised Iran had an important regional role and offered praise for its role in Asian countries beyond the Middle East. The American doctrine that is now averse to intervention in the world and that desires stability, is searching for regional powers that can impose stability and with whom understanding can be reached.
US national interest trumps principle
This is what makes Obama willing to trample all liberal values when it comes to US national security, for example by supporting Abdel Fatah El Sisi militarily and recognising a fascist military regime in Egypt that emerged after a bloody coup against a democratically elected government.
This calls to mind the traditional US stance prior to the era of the neoconservatives. That position put US national security interests above democratic and liberal values, which, while being valid principles for the US constitution, were not seen as good guidelines for US foreign policy in the world, where the friend-or-foe equation overrode them.
In Obama’s discourse after the deal, we notice there is respect and appreciation for Iran as a regional power with which accords are possible, and even shared interests in the future, though differences exist over Iran’s policies in Arab countries. But for the US, in Obama’s view, these differences are disputes and not existential conflicts, and an accord is possible in spite of them.
Obama used the bulk or nearly half of the interview, to give assurances to Israel, a country he considers a real ally and an established democracy. Obama understands Israel’s concerns regarding the deal, even though Israel is the only state that has nuclear weapons in the region, and refuses to submit its nuclear programme to international oversight. Obama has promised to do everything so that the deal does not create any threats to Israel.
To the Arabs, Obama devoted the equivalent of two paragraphs of the interview, stressing he would invite Arab leaders to Camp David to explain the deal and also to preach to them about issues related to armament and their internal policies. The main challenge to the Arab countries, Obama opined, was not Iran, but development and the lack of outlets for Arab youths who could become radicalised as a result.
The problem with Obama’s statements is that they do not compel him to do anything with regard to supporting democracy. His current support for Sisi is the biggest proof of this. What is also interesting is that Obama did not talk about Iran’s internal problems, its repression of minorities, and the suffering of certain religious communities and the Arabs in Iran.
Clearly, the difference here is that there is a US interest in treating Iran as an equal, but there is no corresponding US interest in doing the same with the Arabs, especially given the absence of objective reasons to do so. The US will not pretend the Arab countries are equals when such a reality does not exist.
This is exactly why many Arabs showed support for Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen, including some who consider themselves victims of Saudi policy and Saudi support for the counter-revolution in the region, or in the context of previous Saudi policies in Yemen. They are captivated by any expression of Arab dignity in the face of Iranian expansion and Western disdain for the Arabs.
We say this before the results of the military operation become clear, and how much or not the Arab countries will be able to turn this coalition in the Arabian Peninsula into a precedent to be followed by other Arab assertive endeavours, in Syria or elsewhere. This is especially so given that there are forces opposed to democratic transformation in the region, and that want Decisive Storm to be a prelude to institutionalising Arab intervention against reform and the inevitable democratic transition.
The Iranian revolution was a major turning point in the history of the region. In the beginning, it carried a popular democratic promise and even promises of a Third World renaissance. Soon, however, the revolution was taken over by the conservative clerical establishment and the faction supporting the ideas of velayat-e faqih — rule by the guardian cleric.
The Iranian revolution served as a catalyst for Islamist movements in the 1980s and 1990s, and for the revival of political Islam. Gradually, the sectarian character of the revolution overtook its pan-Islamist character, with Iran perceiving Shia Arabs as its reservist army.
The revival of political Islam that the Iranian revolution contributed to thus turned into a Sunni revival against the Iranian push, as it was sought to mould Shias in general into a transnational monolithic sect. More recently, a similar attempt was made to mould Sunnis at large into a monolithic sect. It is no coincidence that imaginary major sectarian blocs of this kind are corrosive to the nation-state, as they propose themselves as an alternative to the pan-Arab identity.
I have no doubt that the Arab Gulf and the Arab Orient, in general, are still suffering the consequences of the Iranian revolution on the one hand, and the US-led war against Iraq in 2003 and Iran’s exploitation of the invasion on the other hand.
A turning point?
The Lausanne agreement could become a new historical turning point that would rearrange alliances and priorities in the region. The Arabs would be greatly mistaken if they consider this agreement an issue of details that are yet to be agreed upon, or if they consider themselves to be a mere item on the list of the collateral damage of US-Iranian relations.
Iran has always been an important regional power that the Arabs must coexist with as their neighbour, with or without a nuclear deal with the West. Iran, too, must coexist with the Arabs as its neighbours. The model of possible future relations should be one of cooperation, mutual respect, and non-interference in internal affairs.
The major challenge Arabs face in stopping asking for Western protection against Iranian ambitions and feeling permanently threatened is in becoming the main actor in shaping their own destiny. This cannot be achieved without strong Arab states or a union of Arab states, which in turn is impossible to achieve without reforming the political structures of Arab regimes first.
In the meantime, people are resisting Iranian expansion with the means available to them. Under the current contradictions, some are confronting Iran but others find it odd that they are willing to ally even with Saudi Arabia for this purpose. Some who are confronting Arab dictatorships and simultaneously find themselves at odds with Iran find it odd that support for dictatorship has led some Arab nationalists to support Iranian expansion, and consequently undermine pan-Arabism, and to remain silent to the extent of being complicit in the sectarian fragmentation of the Arabs.
The author is an intellectual, academician and General Director of The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies
