Menzies Campbell
Government outrage does not provide a sound basis for such a material policy change as vetoing the EU
arms embargo.
BY Menzies Campbell
The most seductive fallacy in foreign affairs is “something must be done”. It appears that the UK government is ready to veto any extension of the EU arms embargo on Syria when it comes up for review in Brussels on Monday. That would be “something”. As set out by William Hague this week in the House of Commons, the government has not decided to send arms to the “good guys” among the rebels, but wants the flexibility to do so and believes that not to renew the embargo would send a powerful signal to President Bashar Al Assad.
Like many fallacies, it is superficially attractive, when accompanied by a harrowing account of the brutality of the Assad regime, its indiscriminate use of violence against its citizens, and the impact on Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan of the never-ending flood of refugees. But outrage and frustration are not enough to provide an efficient justification or sound basis for such a material policy change.
It is argued that at this stage the policy only extends to modifying or discontinuing the embargo “to keep all options on the table”, but this is disingenuous. Why would the government go to such lengths as to exercise a veto if it did not have a predisposition to follow that with a supply of arms?
Leave aside political consequences for the UK with fellow EU members now and in the future of the exercise of a veto. Ask yourself what might be the result of the flexibility sought by the UK.
How would you identify the groups among Assad’s opponents who would be legitimate recipients of arms on the ground that their values of democracy and human rights are said to be the same as ours? The range of opponents is complex and extensive. Radical Islamists are becoming more influential and powerful, not least since they are funding their activities by plundering Syrian reserves and selling oil on the black market. They most certainly do not share our values of democracy and human rights. How would you prevent arms from falling into their hands? They have proved themselves to be as brutal as Assad. Remember that when the Russians invaded Afghanistan, the US supplied prodigious amounts of weapons to the Mujahideen to help them resist the invaders. Some of these weapons were used against those who supplied them when it became necessary to take on the Taliban after 9/11.
The government answer appears to be you can never be absolutely certain that weapons will not fall into the wrong hands and we will take every precaution to prevent it from happening. This is a thin justification for that risk in a conflict which hardly seems to lack weapons. If there is a risk of weapons falling into the wrong hands, why increase that risk by providing more?
One of the, as yet, unanswered questions is what kind of arms would you provide? Modern weaponry is sophisticated, requiring training and expertise. There is no point in sending arms if the recipients are unable to use them. One tempting answer to that conundrum would be to send military and civilian technicians to provide assistance. This might not be “boots on the ground” as we understand it, but those deployed would provide inviting targets for Assad forces and propaganda for his claim that the conflict is being driven by foreigners intent on bringing down his government.
And what would be the response of his long-time patrons in Moscow? They continue to send sophisticated weapons to Syria — last week they delivered a batch of shore-to-ship missiles which would be an obstacle to any naval blockade or amphibious troop landing. You can be sure that the umbilical cord between Russia and Syria will not fail for a lack of arms supplies.
But the most penetrating question is: Where is the evidence that Assad’s approach would be affected by a veto or its possible consequences so long as he continues to enjoy unqualified Russian support?
If not arms, some say, what about a “no-fly zone” like Libya? Such parallels are inept. The Gaddafi government had no air force and little by way of ground-based air defence. A “no-fly zone” was easily established and maintained. But Syria is different. Russian military assistance over years has given Assad a credible air force and formidable air defences on the ground. To establish a “no-fly zone”, it would be necessary to suppress these ground-based defences which will inevitably be located near centres of population. The risk to civilians would be palpable. And if it is a “no-fly zone” you must be prepared to shoot down intruders. Would not that amount to military intervention?
The position of the US in all of this is central. Little or no information has emerged as a result of the prime minister’s conversations with President Barack Obama in Washington last week. Such silence suggests that for the moment at least the US is content to pursue diplomatic options with Russia.
What can we do? There are no elegant solutions. We can give training and support to those who can be established as holding the same values as ourselves. We can badger those nations who can afford to provide financial assistance in support of the humanitarian refugee effort in the countries bordering Syria. We can throw our weight behind the tentative joint diplomatic effort of Russia and US to convene a conference on Syria. We can caution Israel against getting involved. We can persuade, cajole and bully countries in the region that they have a stake in the outcome and that continuing destabilisation could have damaging consequences for them.
It is said that this change of British government policy is being led by No 10, that the Foreign Office is less enthusiastic and the military deeply sceptical. THE GUARDIAN
Government outrage does not provide a sound basis for such a material policy change as vetoing the EU
arms embargo.
BY Menzies Campbell
The most seductive fallacy in foreign affairs is “something must be done”. It appears that the UK government is ready to veto any extension of the EU arms embargo on Syria when it comes up for review in Brussels on Monday. That would be “something”. As set out by William Hague this week in the House of Commons, the government has not decided to send arms to the “good guys” among the rebels, but wants the flexibility to do so and believes that not to renew the embargo would send a powerful signal to President Bashar Al Assad.
Like many fallacies, it is superficially attractive, when accompanied by a harrowing account of the brutality of the Assad regime, its indiscriminate use of violence against its citizens, and the impact on Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan of the never-ending flood of refugees. But outrage and frustration are not enough to provide an efficient justification or sound basis for such a material policy change.
It is argued that at this stage the policy only extends to modifying or discontinuing the embargo “to keep all options on the table”, but this is disingenuous. Why would the government go to such lengths as to exercise a veto if it did not have a predisposition to follow that with a supply of arms?
Leave aside political consequences for the UK with fellow EU members now and in the future of the exercise of a veto. Ask yourself what might be the result of the flexibility sought by the UK.
How would you identify the groups among Assad’s opponents who would be legitimate recipients of arms on the ground that their values of democracy and human rights are said to be the same as ours? The range of opponents is complex and extensive. Radical Islamists are becoming more influential and powerful, not least since they are funding their activities by plundering Syrian reserves and selling oil on the black market. They most certainly do not share our values of democracy and human rights. How would you prevent arms from falling into their hands? They have proved themselves to be as brutal as Assad. Remember that when the Russians invaded Afghanistan, the US supplied prodigious amounts of weapons to the Mujahideen to help them resist the invaders. Some of these weapons were used against those who supplied them when it became necessary to take on the Taliban after 9/11.
The government answer appears to be you can never be absolutely certain that weapons will not fall into the wrong hands and we will take every precaution to prevent it from happening. This is a thin justification for that risk in a conflict which hardly seems to lack weapons. If there is a risk of weapons falling into the wrong hands, why increase that risk by providing more?
One of the, as yet, unanswered questions is what kind of arms would you provide? Modern weaponry is sophisticated, requiring training and expertise. There is no point in sending arms if the recipients are unable to use them. One tempting answer to that conundrum would be to send military and civilian technicians to provide assistance. This might not be “boots on the ground” as we understand it, but those deployed would provide inviting targets for Assad forces and propaganda for his claim that the conflict is being driven by foreigners intent on bringing down his government.
And what would be the response of his long-time patrons in Moscow? They continue to send sophisticated weapons to Syria — last week they delivered a batch of shore-to-ship missiles which would be an obstacle to any naval blockade or amphibious troop landing. You can be sure that the umbilical cord between Russia and Syria will not fail for a lack of arms supplies.
But the most penetrating question is: Where is the evidence that Assad’s approach would be affected by a veto or its possible consequences so long as he continues to enjoy unqualified Russian support?
If not arms, some say, what about a “no-fly zone” like Libya? Such parallels are inept. The Gaddafi government had no air force and little by way of ground-based air defence. A “no-fly zone” was easily established and maintained. But Syria is different. Russian military assistance over years has given Assad a credible air force and formidable air defences on the ground. To establish a “no-fly zone”, it would be necessary to suppress these ground-based defences which will inevitably be located near centres of population. The risk to civilians would be palpable. And if it is a “no-fly zone” you must be prepared to shoot down intruders. Would not that amount to military intervention?
The position of the US in all of this is central. Little or no information has emerged as a result of the prime minister’s conversations with President Barack Obama in Washington last week. Such silence suggests that for the moment at least the US is content to pursue diplomatic options with Russia.
What can we do? There are no elegant solutions. We can give training and support to those who can be established as holding the same values as ourselves. We can badger those nations who can afford to provide financial assistance in support of the humanitarian refugee effort in the countries bordering Syria. We can throw our weight behind the tentative joint diplomatic effort of Russia and US to convene a conference on Syria. We can caution Israel against getting involved. We can persuade, cajole and bully countries in the region that they have a stake in the outcome and that continuing destabilisation could have damaging consequences for them.
It is said that this change of British government policy is being led by No 10, that the Foreign Office is less enthusiastic and the military deeply sceptical. THE GUARDIAN
