Michael O
By Michael O’Hanlon
In the aftermath of the Egyptian military’s brutal crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood supporters, many have suggested that the US must nevertheless sustain most or all of its $1.5bn in annual aid to Egypt because of our military dependence on the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. While these geographical features of the Arab world’s central state are desirable and convenient for US national security interests in the broader Middle East, and while there are other reasons not to categorically cut off contact with the Egyptian armed forces, the argument of military logistics needs to be placed in perspective.
The US military benefits from being able to send ships through the Suez Canal and fly straight from Mediterranean airspace over Egypt to the Red Sea and then the Persian Gulf. But it does not need these conveniences in any absolute sense. There are alternatives, and we should bear this in mind as policy options toward Egypt are sized up.
Consider first the Navy. The US divides its major warships between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Historically, the division has been relatively even. Since roughly 2012, and President Barack Obama’s rebalancing policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, the Pentagon has announced plans to base 60 percent of Navy vessels in Pacific ports. Most of these are in the mainland US, though some ships are based in Hawaii, Guam, Japan and, soon, Singapore.
To be sure, one can reach the Persian Gulf faster from Norfolk, Va or Jacksonville, Fla., than from California or Washington state — if the Suez is available. The distance via the Atlantic route is about 6,000 miles; the distance via the Pacific route is about twice that. At a comfortable cruising speed, the sailing time is roughly 10 to 12 days vs 20 to 24.
But there is nothing prohibitive about reaching the Persian Gulf region via a westward path — and there would be nothing prohibitive about basing up to, say, 70 percent of the Navy in the Pacific region. Our military planners should bear this in mind, and we should remind Egypt’s military strongmen of our options, should their recent reprehensible behaviour continue.
These changes would come at a cost. The Navy does not like to keep carriers at sea longer than six months straight for the well-being of the crews, and a Pacific route to the Gulf would deprive a carrier battle group of about 10 percent more of its deployment time than would an Atlantic path — largely wasted in added transit. But this transit need not be a complete waste, as the ship can perform exercises with foreign militaries along the way and provide a presence in places such as the Strait of Malacca, a waterway crucial to global trade. Moreover, the Navy can further mitigate the loss of station time, at least for ships smaller than carriers, by making greater use of “crew swaps” — leaving ships at sea for one to two years while rotating sailors by plane every six months.
The calculus is similar for the Air Force, though on balance the trade-offs may be slightly easier because Air Force assets can more easily and quickly be repositioned from the eastern US to the West Coast and vice versa. Much of the issue for the Air Force is refuelling. For aircraft not capable of making a 6,000-mile voyage nonstop, and not able to refuel conveniently in flight (which can depend on tanker availability), the eastern route may include refuelling and rest stops in Ireland, Germany or Italy, then perhaps a flight over Egypt into the Gulf region. A western route is likely to include Alaska or Hawaii, Japan or Guam, then Singapore or Thailand or Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
All of these routes are eminently practicable; indeed, all are routinely used by the US military today. There is a cost to the longer route, which for planes is measured more in fuel and dollars than time. But while the cost can be many tens of thousands of dollars per flight, that $1.5bn in annual aid to Egypt could go a long way toward offsetting it.
The bottom line is as a superpower blessed with easy access to open oceans East and West, the US has options. The last thing we want to signal to Cairo at this crucial moment is anything to the contrary. WP-BLOOMBERG
By Michael O’Hanlon
In the aftermath of the Egyptian military’s brutal crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood supporters, many have suggested that the US must nevertheless sustain most or all of its $1.5bn in annual aid to Egypt because of our military dependence on the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. While these geographical features of the Arab world’s central state are desirable and convenient for US national security interests in the broader Middle East, and while there are other reasons not to categorically cut off contact with the Egyptian armed forces, the argument of military logistics needs to be placed in perspective.
The US military benefits from being able to send ships through the Suez Canal and fly straight from Mediterranean airspace over Egypt to the Red Sea and then the Persian Gulf. But it does not need these conveniences in any absolute sense. There are alternatives, and we should bear this in mind as policy options toward Egypt are sized up.
Consider first the Navy. The US divides its major warships between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Historically, the division has been relatively even. Since roughly 2012, and President Barack Obama’s rebalancing policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, the Pentagon has announced plans to base 60 percent of Navy vessels in Pacific ports. Most of these are in the mainland US, though some ships are based in Hawaii, Guam, Japan and, soon, Singapore.
To be sure, one can reach the Persian Gulf faster from Norfolk, Va or Jacksonville, Fla., than from California or Washington state — if the Suez is available. The distance via the Atlantic route is about 6,000 miles; the distance via the Pacific route is about twice that. At a comfortable cruising speed, the sailing time is roughly 10 to 12 days vs 20 to 24.
But there is nothing prohibitive about reaching the Persian Gulf region via a westward path — and there would be nothing prohibitive about basing up to, say, 70 percent of the Navy in the Pacific region. Our military planners should bear this in mind, and we should remind Egypt’s military strongmen of our options, should their recent reprehensible behaviour continue.
These changes would come at a cost. The Navy does not like to keep carriers at sea longer than six months straight for the well-being of the crews, and a Pacific route to the Gulf would deprive a carrier battle group of about 10 percent more of its deployment time than would an Atlantic path — largely wasted in added transit. But this transit need not be a complete waste, as the ship can perform exercises with foreign militaries along the way and provide a presence in places such as the Strait of Malacca, a waterway crucial to global trade. Moreover, the Navy can further mitigate the loss of station time, at least for ships smaller than carriers, by making greater use of “crew swaps” — leaving ships at sea for one to two years while rotating sailors by plane every six months.
The calculus is similar for the Air Force, though on balance the trade-offs may be slightly easier because Air Force assets can more easily and quickly be repositioned from the eastern US to the West Coast and vice versa. Much of the issue for the Air Force is refuelling. For aircraft not capable of making a 6,000-mile voyage nonstop, and not able to refuel conveniently in flight (which can depend on tanker availability), the eastern route may include refuelling and rest stops in Ireland, Germany or Italy, then perhaps a flight over Egypt into the Gulf region. A western route is likely to include Alaska or Hawaii, Japan or Guam, then Singapore or Thailand or Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
All of these routes are eminently practicable; indeed, all are routinely used by the US military today. There is a cost to the longer route, which for planes is measured more in fuel and dollars than time. But while the cost can be many tens of thousands of dollars per flight, that $1.5bn in annual aid to Egypt could go a long way toward offsetting it.
The bottom line is as a superpower blessed with easy access to open oceans East and West, the US has options. The last thing we want to signal to Cairo at this crucial moment is anything to the contrary. WP-BLOOMBERG
