Wang Son-Taek
The war involving the US, Israel and Iran has triggered a wave of alarm across the international community. Commentators speak of a collapsing US order, the return of an era of war and self-help. These reactions are understandable. Alarm is natural. But misreading is not. Much of the current debate is driven less by prudent analysis than by impetuous perceptions. These misperceptions matter because they shape policy choices. And when policy is based on misreading reality, the costs can be severe.
The first category of misperception concerns the nature of the actor. Many observers equate the actions of US President Donald Trump with the character of the United States itself. This is an excessive simplification.
A president operates within a broader political system, but he or she also leaves a distinct imprint. In the present case, the conduct of the war reflects not merely personal style, but a governing instinct shaped by a preference for unilateral action. Of course, this does not absolve the United States of responsibility.
It is equally important to recognize that the United States is not a monolithic actor. Public opinion remains divided, with significant opposition to this war. Political dynamics will evolve, especially as the current administration also has its due term. To treat a contingent leadership style as a permanent national trait is to mistake the transient for the enduring.
The second category of misperception concerns structure.
The war has led some to conclude that US hegemony and the US-led unipolar order are collapsing. This conclusion is premature.
If anything, the conflict demonstrates that the United States retains the capacity to project power in decisive ways. The problem is not that US hegemony is disappearing, but that it is being used in ways that weaken its own foundations. A more accurate description is that the United States is paying rising costs in maintaining its global position.
This is not the end of American power, but a shift in its character. The difference is critical. Decline suggests inevitability; rising costs imply choices.
Closely related is the claim that the liberal international order itself is collapsing. There is no doubt that recent actions have strained the norms and principles that have guided global politics for decades. Yet it would be a mistake to interpret disruption as transformation.
The current situation reflects a period of stress and adjustment, not replacement. The liberal order was not created overnight, and it will not disappear overnight. It emerged from the hard lessons of the 20th century, shaped by the determination to avoid another cycle of catastrophic conflict. That legacy continues to exert influence, even as the system undergoes recalibration.
The third category of misperception concerns reality on the ground. Some argue that the world is entering a new era of frequent war. This claim does not withstand scrutiny.
Over the long term, the incidence of interstate war has declined significantly since the end of World War II. Recent conflicts, including those in Ukraine and involving Iran, are highly visible and politically charged, which amplifies their perceived significance. But they do not constitute a systemic return to the age of war between nations. Both conflicts reflect asymmetric dynamics in which superpowers are trying to impose their will on weaker actors. Direct military confrontation among major powers remains rare. To interpret isolated but dramatic conflicts as evidence of a general trend is to confuse salience with frequency.
A related misreading is the claim that the world has entered an era of self-help, where states must rely solely on their own capabilities. This argument is not only inaccurate but also potentially dangerous. It risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. It encourages policies that weaken cooperation at a time when solidarity is most needed.
The current environment, marked by uncertainty in US leadership and the absence of a clear alternative hegemon, does not eliminate the need for collective action. On the contrary, it increases it. In such conditions, networks of like-minded states become more important, not less. Middle powers in Europe and Asia are already exploring ways to coordinate their responses to shared challenges.
For South Korea, this means that the appropriate response is neither retreat nor overreaction. The alliance with the United States remains a central pillar of national security and should be managed with care and consistency. At the same time, Seoul should expand its engagement with a broader set of partners, contributing to efforts to stabilize the international system. Overreaction, not the war itself, could pose the greater risk to South Korea’s long-term strategy.
This approach also requires a more sophisticated understanding of strategic autonomy.
Autonomy is often misinterpreted as distance from alliances. In practice, it might be more effectively achieved through them. It is best understood as an embedded capability, not an external alternative. It grows out of relationships rather than in opposition to them.
The challenge is not to choose between dependence and independence, but to integrate the two in a way that expands strategic options.
The deeper problem revealed by the current debate is conceptual. There is a tendency to interpret short-term shocks as indicators of long-term transformation. Events are taken as evidence of structure. This is a natural human response, but a dangerous one in international politics.
History offers a clear warning. In the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attack, many believed that the international order had entered a fundamentally new era. The shock was profound, but the underlying structure endured.
The lesson is directly relevant today. The Iran war is significant, but it does not redefine the global order. Overstating change can be as harmful as ignoring it. What is needed is not alarm, but analytical discipline, the ability to distinguish between leadership and system, between cost and collapse, and between temporary disruption and structural change.
The greatest risk is not the war itself, but how we choose to understand it.
—Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University.
