Peter Van Buren
By Peter Van Buren
The word out of Washington is Nouri Al Maliki must go. A new prime minister, Haider Al Abadi, will unify Iraq with American help.
We’ve seen this movie before — an attempt at a quick fix of Iraq’s problems. Like every other quick fix tried, this one will fail, too.
The US is ignoring the inevitable: Iraq will eventually dissolve into separate nation-states. Efforts are needed to manage that process, not to hope it will go away.
Some history. Following the regime change of 2003 and the elimination of Saddam Hussein, the US failed to create any civil structure to fill the vacuum. Religious, ethnic, tribal and geographic tensions in Iraq were unleashed (I’ll label it all Sunni-Shia-Kurd as shorthand, though the reality is much more complex.)
A US-patched-together “government” (the Governing Council, of which Abadi was a part) accomplished little more than marking the first failed quick fix in the Iraq story.
Desperate to install a “legitimate” government, the US helped slip Maliki — who they knew little about — into power via the Sunni-boycotted elections of 2006.
Maliki did little to encourage the Sunnis to become part of the central power structure, and the insurgency kicked into hyperdrive.
Maliki refused to embrace the surge’s signature Anbar Awakening, another quick fix designed to “create the political space” needed to unify a nation perhaps only George W Bush still believed existed.
Despite Maliki throwing the last serious US reconciliation plan under the bus, America stood by and watched the Iranians broker a deal after the 2010 elections that gave Maliki another four years as prime minister. American eyes were on the exit, and Maliki was the devil we knew — a quick fix to declare enough democracy in Iraq so we could get out.
Maliki’s first action post-US occupation — the very day after the last American combat troops withdrew — was to try and arrest his Sunni vice president, who instead escaped to Turkey. In the spring of this year, Maliki unleashed his army in Anbar to openly kill Sunnis. Labelling the indigenous Sunni movement “terrorist,” the US offered carte blanche for the slaughter. It was hoped this would be a quick fix to the problem of Sunni nationalism. The Sunnis instead grew more committed to their struggle and began to hold territory. Enter the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
Meanwhile, everyone continued to pretend, as they had since 2003, that the Kurds had not already created their own de facto nation-state.
Now, the newest quick fix is for Abadi to form a government that looks unified enough to satisfy the White House.
Abadi starts with little good will on his side. He is a member of Maliki’s Shia party and thus tied to all the problems of the past. He will need to make many deals of convenience with the Iranians, Kurds and Shia militias that will tie his hands, even if he is well-intentioned (no promises there) toward the Sunnis.
The most likely outcome is that nearly everyone in Iraq with a beef will label him an “American stooge” and any Sunnis working with him as “traitors.”
All that makes it very unlikely that Abadi can implement bold changes that might convince the Sunnis to lay down their arms — such as real integration of the Shia-dominated judiciary, as well as the military and police forces. Abadi will, however, talk the talk to get more American money.
The Kurds will also find it necessary to play nice to ensure American protection and weapons, but they are no more committed to a singular Iraqi state now than they were before.
Whatever government exists in Baghdad will also not change the fact that the struggle is now a multinational muscle tussle well outside its control.
Iran is an obvious player, but elements of the rump Syrian government and Turkey exercise considerable power in border areas.
The Saudis and Kuwaitis have interests in keeping the Shias in check and will likely continue to fund the Sunnis.
The newly empowered Islamic State, holding territory and gaining outside support as heroes fighting the American crusaders, could care less who is in charge in Baghdad and will remain in the fight.
There is no quick fix for Iraq. There isn’t really a medium-term fix.
The US has been bombing Iraq on and off since 1991, and more bombing is unlikely to be any more useful in “creating the political space” for reconciliation than the surge that preceded it.
The inevitable outcome is the dissolution of Iraq into several nation-states.
On Thursday, Al Maliki announced he stepped down as Prime Minister of Iraq.
Nature finds a way, as they say, and the longer the US tries to keep the mess it created in Iraq artificially together, the longer it delays what needs to be done: accept the dissolution and work to manage it to the least-violent conclusion.
How to do that is a messy, complicated thing, but step one is not hoping that replacing the prime minister of Iraq will be a quick fix that will work where all others failed.
REUTERS
By Peter Van Buren
The word out of Washington is Nouri Al Maliki must go. A new prime minister, Haider Al Abadi, will unify Iraq with American help.
We’ve seen this movie before — an attempt at a quick fix of Iraq’s problems. Like every other quick fix tried, this one will fail, too.
The US is ignoring the inevitable: Iraq will eventually dissolve into separate nation-states. Efforts are needed to manage that process, not to hope it will go away.
Some history. Following the regime change of 2003 and the elimination of Saddam Hussein, the US failed to create any civil structure to fill the vacuum. Religious, ethnic, tribal and geographic tensions in Iraq were unleashed (I’ll label it all Sunni-Shia-Kurd as shorthand, though the reality is much more complex.)
A US-patched-together “government” (the Governing Council, of which Abadi was a part) accomplished little more than marking the first failed quick fix in the Iraq story.
Desperate to install a “legitimate” government, the US helped slip Maliki — who they knew little about — into power via the Sunni-boycotted elections of 2006.
Maliki did little to encourage the Sunnis to become part of the central power structure, and the insurgency kicked into hyperdrive.
Maliki refused to embrace the surge’s signature Anbar Awakening, another quick fix designed to “create the political space” needed to unify a nation perhaps only George W Bush still believed existed.
Despite Maliki throwing the last serious US reconciliation plan under the bus, America stood by and watched the Iranians broker a deal after the 2010 elections that gave Maliki another four years as prime minister. American eyes were on the exit, and Maliki was the devil we knew — a quick fix to declare enough democracy in Iraq so we could get out.
Maliki’s first action post-US occupation — the very day after the last American combat troops withdrew — was to try and arrest his Sunni vice president, who instead escaped to Turkey. In the spring of this year, Maliki unleashed his army in Anbar to openly kill Sunnis. Labelling the indigenous Sunni movement “terrorist,” the US offered carte blanche for the slaughter. It was hoped this would be a quick fix to the problem of Sunni nationalism. The Sunnis instead grew more committed to their struggle and began to hold territory. Enter the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
Meanwhile, everyone continued to pretend, as they had since 2003, that the Kurds had not already created their own de facto nation-state.
Now, the newest quick fix is for Abadi to form a government that looks unified enough to satisfy the White House.
Abadi starts with little good will on his side. He is a member of Maliki’s Shia party and thus tied to all the problems of the past. He will need to make many deals of convenience with the Iranians, Kurds and Shia militias that will tie his hands, even if he is well-intentioned (no promises there) toward the Sunnis.
The most likely outcome is that nearly everyone in Iraq with a beef will label him an “American stooge” and any Sunnis working with him as “traitors.”
All that makes it very unlikely that Abadi can implement bold changes that might convince the Sunnis to lay down their arms — such as real integration of the Shia-dominated judiciary, as well as the military and police forces. Abadi will, however, talk the talk to get more American money.
The Kurds will also find it necessary to play nice to ensure American protection and weapons, but they are no more committed to a singular Iraqi state now than they were before.
Whatever government exists in Baghdad will also not change the fact that the struggle is now a multinational muscle tussle well outside its control.
Iran is an obvious player, but elements of the rump Syrian government and Turkey exercise considerable power in border areas.
The Saudis and Kuwaitis have interests in keeping the Shias in check and will likely continue to fund the Sunnis.
The newly empowered Islamic State, holding territory and gaining outside support as heroes fighting the American crusaders, could care less who is in charge in Baghdad and will remain in the fight.
There is no quick fix for Iraq. There isn’t really a medium-term fix.
The US has been bombing Iraq on and off since 1991, and more bombing is unlikely to be any more useful in “creating the political space” for reconciliation than the surge that preceded it.
The inevitable outcome is the dissolution of Iraq into several nation-states.
On Thursday, Al Maliki announced he stepped down as Prime Minister of Iraq.
Nature finds a way, as they say, and the longer the US tries to keep the mess it created in Iraq artificially together, the longer it delays what needs to be done: accept the dissolution and work to manage it to the least-violent conclusion.
How to do that is a messy, complicated thing, but step one is not hoping that replacing the prime minister of Iraq will be a quick fix that will work where all others failed.
REUTERS
