William B
By William B Quandt
President Barack Obama delivered a speech Wednesday night designed for an American public that has been losing confidence in its commander in chief. Much of his address was about attitude — we are tough, we will act, we will prevail, but we will do all this with airpower, not boots on the ground (or not many) and in cooperation with friends and allies. This mission will not be a repeat of Afghanistan or Iraq (President George W Bush’s wars), Obama promised, but will be more like Obama’s campaigns against Al Qaeda — don’t forget he killed Osama bin Laden! — and the continuing strikes against radical Islamists in Somalia and Yemen.
But the president must know that the Islamic State cannot be treated like the insurgents in Somalia and Yemen. The reason this group has caused such concern is that it is not just one more localised group of violent guerrillas. It is an embryonic state that is beginning to govern large areas of the Sunni heartlands of Iraq and Syria. So it will not easily be bombed into oblivion, nor will it suffice to take out its top leader with a skilfully executed commando raid, as in Pakistan.
Boots on the ground will be needed to retake the territory now under Islamic State control. But the president has said they will not be our boots. So whose?
His Iraq case is easier to address. Baghdad has a new government that may be capable of rebuilding its security forces and enlisting the cooperation of the Kurdish peshmerga in the north and some Sunni tribes in Anbar province.
This is more a hope than a reality at this point. But it is crucial that an Iraqi presence on the ground be ready to confront Islamic State forces — especially when the battle for Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, comes into focus. It was the loss of Mosul, after all, that made these militants look so threatening, and it will be Mosul’s recovery that could signal Islamic State’s first major reversal of fortune.
Can it be done? I think so. But only if certain conditions are met, and they will require more than working just with friends and allies and conducting relatively risk-free bombing sorties.
It is crucial, however, not to exaggerate the power of Islamic State. It has perhaps 20,000 modestly armed men, scattered across several strategic locations, most important, in Mosul in Iraq and in Raqqa in Syria. Their fighters are tough and ruthless, and have largely succeeded to date because of divisions among their enemies and low morale among Iraqi and Syrian forces. But they are not invincible.
To assemble an Iraqi coalition of forces capable of turning the tide, with air support from the United States and perhaps others, Washington is going to need to communicate with more than its friends and allies. It must extend beyond the Saudis, Gulf states and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members — in short, the parties that Secretary of State John Kerry has been courting.
Iran was not mentioned in Obama’s speech, yet it is a central party in the Iraqi theatre. It has strong influence over the new government of Haidar Al Abadi, Shia militias and the Kurds — all of whom oppose Islamic State. Without at least tacit coordination with Iran, these forces will be difficult to mobilise effectively.
So as part of Washington’s continuing discussions with Iran about its nuclear programme, the Obama administration should be talking “on the sidelines” — in diplospeak, but nonetheless key — about how to combat Islamic State, first in Iraq and then in Syria. As part of a well-considered strategy toward the militant group, Washington is going to need to upgrade the quality of its ties to Tehran.
An agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme within the next few months looks possible, even if some sticky details remain unresolved. This agreement would be vital in its own right, but it would also be a significant step in building the campaign against Islamic State.
The Syrian component of a strategy to defeat these jihadists is more complex — in part because Washington has ruled out dealing with the Syrian regime as part of any strategy.
Obama carelessly announced in 2011 that “Assad must go.” But he had no plan to make that happen. He still clings to his rhetoric, though it now seems clear to most observers that the regime is not about to collapse and that President Bashar Al Assad’s government cannot effectively fight Islamic State unless its struggle with fighters Washington labels “moderate rebels” is brought to an end.
Without much fanfare, the Assad regime has actually been negotiating a series of truces with rebels in western parts of Syria, with the major exception of Aleppo, where an intense fight continues. That battle is a gift to Islamic State. We and our “friends and allies” — and some adversaries (Russia, Iran, China) — should consider reaching an early truce between the rebels and the regime in the Aleppo area, with the understanding that the priority for both parties would be to defeat Islamic State, in cooperation with some internationally sanctioned air support. A United Nations resolution should be possible. The Assad regime and “moderate rebels” should also be pressured to begin serious talks on a political transition.
This was tepidly tried in the Geneva talks earlier this year, and went nowhere. But that was before the Islamic State threat had become so apparent. Without something of this sort, Syria is in for a long and probably inconclusive civil war. Think Lebanon in the late 1970s and 1980s.
If Islamic State militants are to be defeated in Syria, after being defeated in Iraq, there will need to be a framework for a functioning state in Syria. That means that the component parts of Syrian society — Alawites, Christians, Sunnis and Kurds — will all have to be included.
That also means that outsiders such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia will have to curb their enthusiasm for toppling the Assad clan and intermediaries such as Iran. Egypt and Russia will have to work on the regime to bring it to the point where a genuinely inclusive political transition is a possibility.
One lesson from the rapid growth of Islamic State as a threat is that when states border on collapse, as in Syria and Iraq, as well as Libya, Yemen, Somalia and south Sudan, unpleasant things happen.
At a minimum, functioning states — as we now see in places like Turkey, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, in addition to Egypt and Iran — provide a degree of order and security.
Some even provide a modicum of freedom and prosperity. And none today are mired in the kind of destructive violence that engulfs the once-proud states of Iraq and Syria.
Washington’s interest is in the defeat of Islamic State and the rehabilitation of functioning states in Iraq and Syria. The defeat of the Islamist group should be a step along the path to that goal.
If Obama wants to have a winning strategy in the Middle East, he will need more than drones and air strikes. He will also need smart diplomacy, beginning with a determined effort to work out understandings with Iran.
His next speech, perhaps after the liberation of Mosul from Islamic State terror, should begin to explain to the American public the real complexities of unscrambling the messy legacy of the flawed US intervention in Iraq in 2003.
But for now, he should talk less and act smart. REUTERS
By William B Quandt
President Barack Obama delivered a speech Wednesday night designed for an American public that has been losing confidence in its commander in chief. Much of his address was about attitude — we are tough, we will act, we will prevail, but we will do all this with airpower, not boots on the ground (or not many) and in cooperation with friends and allies. This mission will not be a repeat of Afghanistan or Iraq (President George W Bush’s wars), Obama promised, but will be more like Obama’s campaigns against Al Qaeda — don’t forget he killed Osama bin Laden! — and the continuing strikes against radical Islamists in Somalia and Yemen.
But the president must know that the Islamic State cannot be treated like the insurgents in Somalia and Yemen. The reason this group has caused such concern is that it is not just one more localised group of violent guerrillas. It is an embryonic state that is beginning to govern large areas of the Sunni heartlands of Iraq and Syria. So it will not easily be bombed into oblivion, nor will it suffice to take out its top leader with a skilfully executed commando raid, as in Pakistan.
Boots on the ground will be needed to retake the territory now under Islamic State control. But the president has said they will not be our boots. So whose?
His Iraq case is easier to address. Baghdad has a new government that may be capable of rebuilding its security forces and enlisting the cooperation of the Kurdish peshmerga in the north and some Sunni tribes in Anbar province.
This is more a hope than a reality at this point. But it is crucial that an Iraqi presence on the ground be ready to confront Islamic State forces — especially when the battle for Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, comes into focus. It was the loss of Mosul, after all, that made these militants look so threatening, and it will be Mosul’s recovery that could signal Islamic State’s first major reversal of fortune.
Can it be done? I think so. But only if certain conditions are met, and they will require more than working just with friends and allies and conducting relatively risk-free bombing sorties.
It is crucial, however, not to exaggerate the power of Islamic State. It has perhaps 20,000 modestly armed men, scattered across several strategic locations, most important, in Mosul in Iraq and in Raqqa in Syria. Their fighters are tough and ruthless, and have largely succeeded to date because of divisions among their enemies and low morale among Iraqi and Syrian forces. But they are not invincible.
To assemble an Iraqi coalition of forces capable of turning the tide, with air support from the United States and perhaps others, Washington is going to need to communicate with more than its friends and allies. It must extend beyond the Saudis, Gulf states and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members — in short, the parties that Secretary of State John Kerry has been courting.
Iran was not mentioned in Obama’s speech, yet it is a central party in the Iraqi theatre. It has strong influence over the new government of Haidar Al Abadi, Shia militias and the Kurds — all of whom oppose Islamic State. Without at least tacit coordination with Iran, these forces will be difficult to mobilise effectively.
So as part of Washington’s continuing discussions with Iran about its nuclear programme, the Obama administration should be talking “on the sidelines” — in diplospeak, but nonetheless key — about how to combat Islamic State, first in Iraq and then in Syria. As part of a well-considered strategy toward the militant group, Washington is going to need to upgrade the quality of its ties to Tehran.
An agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme within the next few months looks possible, even if some sticky details remain unresolved. This agreement would be vital in its own right, but it would also be a significant step in building the campaign against Islamic State.
The Syrian component of a strategy to defeat these jihadists is more complex — in part because Washington has ruled out dealing with the Syrian regime as part of any strategy.
Obama carelessly announced in 2011 that “Assad must go.” But he had no plan to make that happen. He still clings to his rhetoric, though it now seems clear to most observers that the regime is not about to collapse and that President Bashar Al Assad’s government cannot effectively fight Islamic State unless its struggle with fighters Washington labels “moderate rebels” is brought to an end.
Without much fanfare, the Assad regime has actually been negotiating a series of truces with rebels in western parts of Syria, with the major exception of Aleppo, where an intense fight continues. That battle is a gift to Islamic State. We and our “friends and allies” — and some adversaries (Russia, Iran, China) — should consider reaching an early truce between the rebels and the regime in the Aleppo area, with the understanding that the priority for both parties would be to defeat Islamic State, in cooperation with some internationally sanctioned air support. A United Nations resolution should be possible. The Assad regime and “moderate rebels” should also be pressured to begin serious talks on a political transition.
This was tepidly tried in the Geneva talks earlier this year, and went nowhere. But that was before the Islamic State threat had become so apparent. Without something of this sort, Syria is in for a long and probably inconclusive civil war. Think Lebanon in the late 1970s and 1980s.
If Islamic State militants are to be defeated in Syria, after being defeated in Iraq, there will need to be a framework for a functioning state in Syria. That means that the component parts of Syrian society — Alawites, Christians, Sunnis and Kurds — will all have to be included.
That also means that outsiders such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia will have to curb their enthusiasm for toppling the Assad clan and intermediaries such as Iran. Egypt and Russia will have to work on the regime to bring it to the point where a genuinely inclusive political transition is a possibility.
One lesson from the rapid growth of Islamic State as a threat is that when states border on collapse, as in Syria and Iraq, as well as Libya, Yemen, Somalia and south Sudan, unpleasant things happen.
At a minimum, functioning states — as we now see in places like Turkey, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, in addition to Egypt and Iran — provide a degree of order and security.
Some even provide a modicum of freedom and prosperity. And none today are mired in the kind of destructive violence that engulfs the once-proud states of Iraq and Syria.
Washington’s interest is in the defeat of Islamic State and the rehabilitation of functioning states in Iraq and Syria. The defeat of the Islamist group should be a step along the path to that goal.
If Obama wants to have a winning strategy in the Middle East, he will need more than drones and air strikes. He will also need smart diplomacy, beginning with a determined effort to work out understandings with Iran.
His next speech, perhaps after the liberation of Mosul from Islamic State terror, should begin to explain to the American public the real complexities of unscrambling the messy legacy of the flawed US intervention in Iraq in 2003.
But for now, he should talk less and act smart. REUTERS
