Robert M
By Robert M Danin
I first met Bashar Al Assad in his Damascus palace 10 years ago. In May 2003, I was part of a senior US government team that went to Syria and told Assad to stop sending jihadists to Iraq to kill Americans; to stop supporting terrorist groups in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine; and to halt the development of weapons of mass destruction.
US officials could not have been clearer as we dressed down the Syrian leader in his own home. Unfazed, he politely denied the veracity of all of our allegations and asked for evidence.
So, some months later, another team of US officials, including myself, travelled to Damascus and went one step further, showing him incontrovertible proof of the unacceptable behaviour that, we warned, he needed to stop immediately.
There was no ambiguity in our message — or so we thought.
But the message we thought we had conveyed to Assad was not the one he took away. Rather than feel frightened by our warning, Assad took comfort from the fact that US officials went to the trouble of travelling to him to talk.
From this, he deduced that his overriding concern — physical survival — was no longer a worry: The US wasn’t going to topple him as it just had Saddam Hussein in neighbouring Iraq.
This episode is worth recalling as the country assesses what, if anything, to do about Syria. President Barack Obama has outlined his key objective in a military strike as sending a “shot across the bow” so that Assad will “meet the narrow concern around chemical weapons.”
The primary goal of the resolution that the president proposed is deterring the future use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
That may be the president’s message, but Assad’s takeaway is sure to be different. The Syrian leader will focus on the US’ self- imposed prohibitions on any military action — no US “boots on the ground,” no effort to overthrow the regime, no serious effort to tilt the balance of power in Syria, no “long-term campaign.”
And then he will sigh in relief. Assad will take succour in Obama’s stated commitment to steps that “would be very limited and would not involve a long-term commitment or a major operation.” And why not? This amounts to saying that, other than using chemical weapons, Assad’s ruthless killing to date does not merit a US response.
The Syrian president is no doubt willing to take some blows from the US for using chemical weapons on his own people.
The Syrian regime can absorb such blows, just as it has taken other US strikes on the chin.
In December 1983, the US Air Force dispatched 28 fighter aircraft against Syrian military positions in Lebanon after the Syrians fired surface-to-air missiles at US aircraft.
At the time, the Pentagon said the goal was to prevent further targeting of US reconnaissance flights. But it didn’t work. Syrian anti-aircraft fire shot down two US jets.
In February 1984, the US pounded Syrian targets from warships in what has been called “the heaviest shore bombardment since the Korean War.” Syria’s behaviour did not change, and US forces went home.
Amid Syria’s brutal civil war, limited US air strikes in the coming weeks are likely to be used by Assad to rally nationalist sentiment, both at home and in the wider Middle East, against the foreign “terrorist forces” and imperialists he has blamed for Syria’s violence.
The use of US military force might prompt Assad to halt further chemical-weapon attacks, but he would probably ratchet up his use of conventional weapons against his own people, recognising that the international community has been willing to avert its gaze from the deaths of more than 100,000 Syrians since 2011.
Such a scenario would nonetheless allow the US to declare its limited objectives fulfilled.
The alternative to such a limited approach that allows Assad to win the battle of perceptions is not a US ground invasion.
But if the Obama administration wants to send a message to Assad that he accurately understands, the US must provide not only a credible response to his recent use of chemical weapons but also make him believe that response is part of a larger strategy to compel him to stop slaughtering his own people — by any means.
Such an approach would require a US commitment to doing more than limited strikes against facilities related to chemical weapons. But it is the only message Assad will understand.
WP-BLOOMBERG
By Robert M Danin
I first met Bashar Al Assad in his Damascus palace 10 years ago. In May 2003, I was part of a senior US government team that went to Syria and told Assad to stop sending jihadists to Iraq to kill Americans; to stop supporting terrorist groups in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine; and to halt the development of weapons of mass destruction.
US officials could not have been clearer as we dressed down the Syrian leader in his own home. Unfazed, he politely denied the veracity of all of our allegations and asked for evidence.
So, some months later, another team of US officials, including myself, travelled to Damascus and went one step further, showing him incontrovertible proof of the unacceptable behaviour that, we warned, he needed to stop immediately.
There was no ambiguity in our message — or so we thought.
But the message we thought we had conveyed to Assad was not the one he took away. Rather than feel frightened by our warning, Assad took comfort from the fact that US officials went to the trouble of travelling to him to talk.
From this, he deduced that his overriding concern — physical survival — was no longer a worry: The US wasn’t going to topple him as it just had Saddam Hussein in neighbouring Iraq.
This episode is worth recalling as the country assesses what, if anything, to do about Syria. President Barack Obama has outlined his key objective in a military strike as sending a “shot across the bow” so that Assad will “meet the narrow concern around chemical weapons.”
The primary goal of the resolution that the president proposed is deterring the future use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
That may be the president’s message, but Assad’s takeaway is sure to be different. The Syrian leader will focus on the US’ self- imposed prohibitions on any military action — no US “boots on the ground,” no effort to overthrow the regime, no serious effort to tilt the balance of power in Syria, no “long-term campaign.”
And then he will sigh in relief. Assad will take succour in Obama’s stated commitment to steps that “would be very limited and would not involve a long-term commitment or a major operation.” And why not? This amounts to saying that, other than using chemical weapons, Assad’s ruthless killing to date does not merit a US response.
The Syrian president is no doubt willing to take some blows from the US for using chemical weapons on his own people.
The Syrian regime can absorb such blows, just as it has taken other US strikes on the chin.
In December 1983, the US Air Force dispatched 28 fighter aircraft against Syrian military positions in Lebanon after the Syrians fired surface-to-air missiles at US aircraft.
At the time, the Pentagon said the goal was to prevent further targeting of US reconnaissance flights. But it didn’t work. Syrian anti-aircraft fire shot down two US jets.
In February 1984, the US pounded Syrian targets from warships in what has been called “the heaviest shore bombardment since the Korean War.” Syria’s behaviour did not change, and US forces went home.
Amid Syria’s brutal civil war, limited US air strikes in the coming weeks are likely to be used by Assad to rally nationalist sentiment, both at home and in the wider Middle East, against the foreign “terrorist forces” and imperialists he has blamed for Syria’s violence.
The use of US military force might prompt Assad to halt further chemical-weapon attacks, but he would probably ratchet up his use of conventional weapons against his own people, recognising that the international community has been willing to avert its gaze from the deaths of more than 100,000 Syrians since 2011.
Such a scenario would nonetheless allow the US to declare its limited objectives fulfilled.
The alternative to such a limited approach that allows Assad to win the battle of perceptions is not a US ground invasion.
But if the Obama administration wants to send a message to Assad that he accurately understands, the US must provide not only a credible response to his recent use of chemical weapons but also make him believe that response is part of a larger strategy to compel him to stop slaughtering his own people — by any means.
Such an approach would require a US commitment to doing more than limited strikes against facilities related to chemical weapons. But it is the only message Assad will understand.
WP-BLOOMBERG
