Dr Mohammed Al Sulami
After decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after being away from the international political arena and the balance of global superpowers, Russia rises again to come back as an essential player and influencer holding the keys of the political conflicts and games.
Since the end of the eighties, the United States of America has constituted a unipolar axe in the world, but Moscow has shaken off the dust of those years to become an important figure in the world driven by the great ambition of the current President, Vladimir Putin, who often longed to build modern and powerful Russia, a country that doesn’t accept to be marginalised or to limit its role in the light of the changes that beset the world on the political and economic levels.
Perhaps Iran will be one of the competition grounds between Moscow and Washington in the foreseeable future.
We will not go far when talking about the nature of the nuclear programme and the extent of its peace usage; what concerns us is the reflection of American-Russian disagreements on the progress of negotiations, and more importantly on the post-negotiations stage.
The establishment of nuclear power The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the Group of 5+1 (US, France, Britain, China, Russia, and Germany) goes very slowly toward a temporary agreement that has been extended twice for the hope of compromising and reaching a comprehensive lasting agreement for the Iranian nuclear programme.
Iran’s nuclear programme was established during the Shah’s era by the Americans. Khomeini criticised the programme from exile and considered it a waste of wealth and people’s money.
Years after the revolution, the nuclear programme is revived again, but this time with a technical support from the Russian side.
Russia knows that any agreement will lead to create an alliance or even a substantial convergence between Washington and Tehran, which in turn would be very detrimental to the interests of Moscow not only on the Iranian but also on the European level.
I have hinted and stated that Moscow would use the negotiations with Iran in the light of its disagreement with the United States and Europe if Moscow doesn’t receive an acceptable settlement in relation to the Ukrainian crisis.
Sergei Ryabkov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, was very clear when mentioning after one of the negotiation sessions that “If we are forced on it (referring to the Ukrainian crisis), we’ll take retaliatory action.” He referred to the nuclear talks between the 5+1 group and Iran.
A crisis of confidence
Here the question is: Does Tehran have trust in Moscow? It is rare to find a report or an analysis that addresses this issue in this particular context.
My humble knowledge of how Iran thinks makes me sure that Iran’s political, intellectual and ideological leadership doesn’t trust Moscow, but it benefits from it during time of crises, and this is for many reasons including the common interests between these two countries.
History is always present in the Iranian imagination on the official and public levels.
Yes, historically, Russian presence on the Iranian arena is very negative; Russia defeated Iran in two major wars during the first half of the nineteenth century, and carved out parts of the Iranian territory.
Early in the twentieth century, Moscow also played the role of economic hegemony over Iran, and shared the influence over the Iranian territory with Britain during the era of the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911).
Currently, there is a good political and economic relation between these two countries, but it didn’t wipe the history with its wounds as it didn’t change the Iranian public mood toward Russia.
Militarisation and the economy
On the other hand, Russia played few military deals with Iran, where Moscow withdrew from supplying Iran with S-300 ballistic missiles; recently it proposed to replace that with “2500 Ante” as a reward if Tehran drops its complaint against “RosoboronExport” that is present in the Court of Geneva, which Iran issued when the company stopped the first deal.
More importantly, Russia is aware of the risk of Western economic openness to Iran, especially since American, German, and French companies became ready to launch their products in the lucrative Iranian market, whenever the agreement of the Iranian nuclear file is finalised.
When the relations between Tehran and Western capitals return to normal, Iran will become a strong competitor to Russia on exporting gas to Europe; it is strongly promoted due to its geographical location and the size of its production of natural gas. The matter that makes Moscow doesn’t basically want to think about; let alone know how indicators for Iran to attain this position have emerged on the ground.
The Iranian gas is a good alternative for the European countries from the economic and strategic point of view, in terms of low-cost and geographical location of Iran. Most importantly, the replacement of Russian with the Iranian gas gives the European side a chance to escape from the political and economic pressure that Russia holds in the face of Europeans at the emergence of any disagreement between these two sides.
Russian fears
Accordingly, it is natural to wonder why Russia would accept to be a party in a deal that brings harm to its interests and strategies?
Indeed, Moscow, while it aligns with Tehran at the current time with the opposite side, Washington and European capitals, doesn’t want to spoil the negotiations and be viewed as the reason behind blocking the final agreement with Iran.
However, Moscow will not accept any agreement to be against its interests, whether in Eastern Europe or the Middle East. It is logical, in addition to international competition, that Washington and Moscow are on the board of the same “ship.”
From here, we believe that Russia would block access to a final and comprehensive solution which in turn may result in an alliance or a significant rapprochement between Iran and the United States, unless there was a Russian coordination with Iran concerning the nature of the situation after the agreement or the period in which there will be commitment to an agreement before going beyond or retracting it. Hence, this may be the closest scenario to reality, from my personal perspective.
In other words, by virtue of its good understanding of the nature of the regime in Tehran, Russia knows that Iran will not continue further in the commitment to an agreement expected with the 5+1 group, and therefore Moscow is currently silent but supports Iran in this regard.
Perhaps the signing of the recent armed and military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran also supports this idea.
Iranian calculations
Finally, everyone is aware that in the first place the political game is built on the principle of calculation of interests and threats to each of the strategic, political, economic, and military branches. Therefore any coming Russian or Iranian move will be preceded by a study of gains and losses.
Iran is also going to be in an embarrassing situation in front of its followers on one hand, and its supporters and allies in the recent past on the other hand.
Economic openness drips the Iranian politicians as well as foreign companies’ saliva. However, this may make Iran lose the Russian side that knows much more of what Iranians know about the secrets of their nuclear plants and military force; Moscow is the mistrusted side in Iran’s perception.
Here lies the equation of the Iranian calculations and the dangers of at least taking decisions in the next few years.
The author is a political analyst and specialist in Iranian affairs
