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Views /Opinion

What is the definition for Venezuela’s new poor?

Juan Nagel

07 Jun 2014

 

By Juan Nagel
When the Venezuelan government defends itself from its critics, it usually points to declining poverty rates as proof of its success. For a while, this worked; poverty figures indeed improved during a portion of the chavista years. But the days when poverty was a winning issue for chavismo are over. Official statistics now show that poverty is rising rapidly.
Venezuela’s official statistics office (INE) mostly spends its time producing reports charged with political language -- but it still manages to report actual data once in a while. A few weeks ago, the statisticians published proof that one in three Venezuelans are poor, when twelve months ago the figure stood at one in four. Since an important part of the argument against the opposition is the government’s claim that they, and only they, ensure decreasing poverty, this is a significant development.
To calculate the poverty rate, the INE estimates the cost of a representative basket of goods, which includes things such as food, dress, housing, transportation, health, communications, and education. The basket is intended as a representative sample of the type of things an average Venezuelan family consumes during a year. If per capita income falls below the cost of this basic basket of goods, the person is considered poor. The chavista revolution indeed helped the poor between 2003 and 2007, but since 2007, the number of poor Venezuelans has actually increased. All of the government’s successes in reducing poverty happened more than six years ago.
Poverty in Chávez’s Venezuela in the mid-2000s was indeed falling, and the government kept prices artificially low thanks to an overvalued currency and massive amounts of subsidised imports. People benefitting from the government’s generous social programmes found plenty to buy, since the government made sure imports kept flowing and prices were low. Needless to say, this couldn’t last. The 2012 campaign to re-elect a mortally ill Hugo Chávez meant government spending went into overdrive. Suddenly the oil boom was not enough to sustain ever increasing social needs. That year, the budget deficit soared past 10 percent of GDP. The price of oil had stopped rising by then, and foreign funding began to dry up.
While the government continued to enjoy good fortune at the ballot box, the bubble was close to bursting for Venezuela’s poor.
The sharp fall in the standard of living is what brought protesters to Venezuela’s streets. Many of the people demonstrating are what we could call “the emerging poor”: people who were middle class during the boom, but have found that their economic situation has deteriorated sharply since then.
Ultimately, chavismo’s “victory” against poverty is just rhetoric. What little gains there were in terms of poverty were due to a government that turned an oil boom into a transient consumption boom. That phase is now over, and poverty is reverting to its long-run trend.
The day of reckoning for the populist chavista model is approaching fast. The speed at which it arrives will depend on the price of oil. If oil holds steady, the government will muddle through. But if the price of oil dips -- watch out. Poverty will continue shooting up, and the new poor will remain in the streets.                               WP-BLOOMBERG

 

By Juan Nagel
When the Venezuelan government defends itself from its critics, it usually points to declining poverty rates as proof of its success. For a while, this worked; poverty figures indeed improved during a portion of the chavista years. But the days when poverty was a winning issue for chavismo are over. Official statistics now show that poverty is rising rapidly.
Venezuela’s official statistics office (INE) mostly spends its time producing reports charged with political language -- but it still manages to report actual data once in a while. A few weeks ago, the statisticians published proof that one in three Venezuelans are poor, when twelve months ago the figure stood at one in four. Since an important part of the argument against the opposition is the government’s claim that they, and only they, ensure decreasing poverty, this is a significant development.
To calculate the poverty rate, the INE estimates the cost of a representative basket of goods, which includes things such as food, dress, housing, transportation, health, communications, and education. The basket is intended as a representative sample of the type of things an average Venezuelan family consumes during a year. If per capita income falls below the cost of this basic basket of goods, the person is considered poor. The chavista revolution indeed helped the poor between 2003 and 2007, but since 2007, the number of poor Venezuelans has actually increased. All of the government’s successes in reducing poverty happened more than six years ago.
Poverty in Chávez’s Venezuela in the mid-2000s was indeed falling, and the government kept prices artificially low thanks to an overvalued currency and massive amounts of subsidised imports. People benefitting from the government’s generous social programmes found plenty to buy, since the government made sure imports kept flowing and prices were low. Needless to say, this couldn’t last. The 2012 campaign to re-elect a mortally ill Hugo Chávez meant government spending went into overdrive. Suddenly the oil boom was not enough to sustain ever increasing social needs. That year, the budget deficit soared past 10 percent of GDP. The price of oil had stopped rising by then, and foreign funding began to dry up.
While the government continued to enjoy good fortune at the ballot box, the bubble was close to bursting for Venezuela’s poor.
The sharp fall in the standard of living is what brought protesters to Venezuela’s streets. Many of the people demonstrating are what we could call “the emerging poor”: people who were middle class during the boom, but have found that their economic situation has deteriorated sharply since then.
Ultimately, chavismo’s “victory” against poverty is just rhetoric. What little gains there were in terms of poverty were due to a government that turned an oil boom into a transient consumption boom. That phase is now over, and poverty is reverting to its long-run trend.
The day of reckoning for the populist chavista model is approaching fast. The speed at which it arrives will depend on the price of oil. If oil holds steady, the government will muddle through. But if the price of oil dips -- watch out. Poverty will continue shooting up, and the new poor will remain in the streets.                               WP-BLOOMBERG