Hugo Dixon
By Hugo Dixon
What should the West’s military policy be toward Islamic State?
Most observers fall into two camps. Some point to the sorry history of Western intervention in the Middle East and argue the job of combating the IS should be left to local powers.
Others say the West, led by the US, should be more active in fighting the insurgents. Only the West has the firepower to defeat the group, the argument goes, and it has a responsibility to fix what it has broken as well as a strategic interest in stopping the IS militants from becoming more powerful and dangerous.
But there is a third, better alternative: make the West’s help conditional on local powers taking the main responsibility for dealing with the IS threat. That doesn’t just mean fighting the jihadists. It means also not fighting each other. If the US, Britain, France and others start throwing their weight around, the risk is that regional players will be under less pressure themselves to make difficult compromises.
President Barack Obama started off pursuing roughly this third option. The president didn’t want to act as Iraq’s air force until its Shia-led regime reached out to moderate Sunnis and Kurds, and included them in the government.
This strategy was absolutely right. If Washington had rushed to Baghdad’s defence, the highly divisive Nuri Al Maliki would probably still be prime minister. There would have been little chance of getting an inclusive government — and little chance of wooing back Sunnis, some of whom have felt they had no other option but to throw in their lot with IS militants.
In the end, Obama moved in early August before Maliki was ousted. This was because IS was threatening to overrun the Iraqi Kurds’ capital and massacre a large group of Yazidis stranded on Sinjar Mountain. The action was reasonable because of the emergency. It helped other groups rather than Maliki’s core supporters. Maliki resigned soon after and was replaced by the more emollient Haider Al Abadi.
However, Obama has not followed the same approach in Syria — despite his earlier inclination to keep out of a grisly civil war, which has already killed about 200,000 people according to the United Nations. President Bashar Al Assad runs a far more divisive and brutal regime than Maliki ever did.
Yet the US America has gone ahead and bombed IS inside Syria. Obama’s switch of policy seems to have been prompted by IS’s beheading two + journalists and by the scathing criticism he endured in late August for saying that he didn’t yet have a Syria strategy.
Though that was an unfortunate remark, Obama compounded the error by taking the fight inside Syria before there was a political deal. The action has had the unwanted side effect of taking the pressure off the Assad regime and its backers in Iran. Some, but not all, of the Syrian moderate rebels — who have been fighting both Assad and IS — have been dismayed.
Ultimately, the only half-decent solution to the Syrian nightmare will be some sort of political deal between the regime and the moderates that sees the Assad clan leaving office. On the back of such a deal, the West — and, in fact, the whole international community – could support a new Syrian government in an effort to clean out IS militants.
Such a peace agreement may yet occur. But the US military intervention has cut the chances of it and pushed it further into the future.
Some may argue that there was little chance of getting rid of Assad anyway. But before the US started bombing, IS fighters had inflicted a series of military defeats on his army in northeast Syria. Assad was feeling the heat even from traditional supporters in Damascus. If the IS onslaught had continued unchecked for a few more months, some people in the regime might have realised that the only way forward was to oust Assad.
It is not too late for Obama to turn down the dial of his attacks on IS in the north-east of Syria. That would require making it clear to Damascus (and its Iranian backers) that he is doing so until it makes peace with the moderate Syrians.
But what about northwest Syria, where IS is close to surrounding Kobani, a Kurdish stronghold? Surely Washington is justified in bombing the militants there, as it has been doing in recent days, in an attempt to prevent a humanitarian disaster?
The answer is a qualified yes. The world does have a right, and even a duty, to intervene to prevent crimes against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing or war crimes when the government of the country in which they are occurring is unable or unwilling to act itself. This is the doctrine of “responsibility to protect” which was unanimously approved at the UN World Summit in 2005.
But such humanitarian military interventions (if that isn’t an oxymoron) are unlikely to end well unless several other conditions are met. One is that the intervening powers should genuinely want to help the people threatened with massacre. That means, among other things, that they should be prepared to stick the course and rebuild the afflicted area even when the crisis is no longer on their citizens’ television screens.
One only has to look at Libya’s descent into a semi-failed state since 2011 to realise the risks of military interventions undertaken with an eye on the evening news but without a proper follow-through plan. Before engaging in humanitarian military interventions, governments should also aim to get the approval of the UN Security Council, since that would give their actions greater legitimacy. Ideally, the mandate would be clearly defined, preventing mission creep. This was not the case with Libya, where the Anglo-French-led coalition used UN authorisation to impose a no-fly-zone as a cloak for getting rid of Muammar Gaddafi.
A Security Council mandate to intervene to protect the Kurds in northwest Syria would be hard to obtain because Russia might veto it. But the US should still try to secure one.
Indeed, the role of the Security Council was explicitly mentioned in the World Summit’s backing of the responsibility-to-protect doctrine. If Washington fails, it could seek the support of the UN General Assembly — in which all countries have a vote and none has a veto.
Although this is not the normal way of getting authorisation for military action, Washington did use the so-called Uniting for Peace procedure in 1950 to get round the Russian veto and legitimise the Korean War. What’s more, the 2005 summit also mentioned the General Assembly’s responsibility to protect populations from crimes against humanity.
Apart from legitimacy, a proper UN debate and mandate might clarify what the world’s strategy is for combatting IS — something that is still unclear.
That, in turn, would increase the chance of success. REUTERS
By Hugo Dixon
What should the West’s military policy be toward Islamic State?
Most observers fall into two camps. Some point to the sorry history of Western intervention in the Middle East and argue the job of combating the IS should be left to local powers.
Others say the West, led by the US, should be more active in fighting the insurgents. Only the West has the firepower to defeat the group, the argument goes, and it has a responsibility to fix what it has broken as well as a strategic interest in stopping the IS militants from becoming more powerful and dangerous.
But there is a third, better alternative: make the West’s help conditional on local powers taking the main responsibility for dealing with the IS threat. That doesn’t just mean fighting the jihadists. It means also not fighting each other. If the US, Britain, France and others start throwing their weight around, the risk is that regional players will be under less pressure themselves to make difficult compromises.
President Barack Obama started off pursuing roughly this third option. The president didn’t want to act as Iraq’s air force until its Shia-led regime reached out to moderate Sunnis and Kurds, and included them in the government.
This strategy was absolutely right. If Washington had rushed to Baghdad’s defence, the highly divisive Nuri Al Maliki would probably still be prime minister. There would have been little chance of getting an inclusive government — and little chance of wooing back Sunnis, some of whom have felt they had no other option but to throw in their lot with IS militants.
In the end, Obama moved in early August before Maliki was ousted. This was because IS was threatening to overrun the Iraqi Kurds’ capital and massacre a large group of Yazidis stranded on Sinjar Mountain. The action was reasonable because of the emergency. It helped other groups rather than Maliki’s core supporters. Maliki resigned soon after and was replaced by the more emollient Haider Al Abadi.
However, Obama has not followed the same approach in Syria — despite his earlier inclination to keep out of a grisly civil war, which has already killed about 200,000 people according to the United Nations. President Bashar Al Assad runs a far more divisive and brutal regime than Maliki ever did.
Yet the US America has gone ahead and bombed IS inside Syria. Obama’s switch of policy seems to have been prompted by IS’s beheading two + journalists and by the scathing criticism he endured in late August for saying that he didn’t yet have a Syria strategy.
Though that was an unfortunate remark, Obama compounded the error by taking the fight inside Syria before there was a political deal. The action has had the unwanted side effect of taking the pressure off the Assad regime and its backers in Iran. Some, but not all, of the Syrian moderate rebels — who have been fighting both Assad and IS — have been dismayed.
Ultimately, the only half-decent solution to the Syrian nightmare will be some sort of political deal between the regime and the moderates that sees the Assad clan leaving office. On the back of such a deal, the West — and, in fact, the whole international community – could support a new Syrian government in an effort to clean out IS militants.
Such a peace agreement may yet occur. But the US military intervention has cut the chances of it and pushed it further into the future.
Some may argue that there was little chance of getting rid of Assad anyway. But before the US started bombing, IS fighters had inflicted a series of military defeats on his army in northeast Syria. Assad was feeling the heat even from traditional supporters in Damascus. If the IS onslaught had continued unchecked for a few more months, some people in the regime might have realised that the only way forward was to oust Assad.
It is not too late for Obama to turn down the dial of his attacks on IS in the north-east of Syria. That would require making it clear to Damascus (and its Iranian backers) that he is doing so until it makes peace with the moderate Syrians.
But what about northwest Syria, where IS is close to surrounding Kobani, a Kurdish stronghold? Surely Washington is justified in bombing the militants there, as it has been doing in recent days, in an attempt to prevent a humanitarian disaster?
The answer is a qualified yes. The world does have a right, and even a duty, to intervene to prevent crimes against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing or war crimes when the government of the country in which they are occurring is unable or unwilling to act itself. This is the doctrine of “responsibility to protect” which was unanimously approved at the UN World Summit in 2005.
But such humanitarian military interventions (if that isn’t an oxymoron) are unlikely to end well unless several other conditions are met. One is that the intervening powers should genuinely want to help the people threatened with massacre. That means, among other things, that they should be prepared to stick the course and rebuild the afflicted area even when the crisis is no longer on their citizens’ television screens.
One only has to look at Libya’s descent into a semi-failed state since 2011 to realise the risks of military interventions undertaken with an eye on the evening news but without a proper follow-through plan. Before engaging in humanitarian military interventions, governments should also aim to get the approval of the UN Security Council, since that would give their actions greater legitimacy. Ideally, the mandate would be clearly defined, preventing mission creep. This was not the case with Libya, where the Anglo-French-led coalition used UN authorisation to impose a no-fly-zone as a cloak for getting rid of Muammar Gaddafi.
A Security Council mandate to intervene to protect the Kurds in northwest Syria would be hard to obtain because Russia might veto it. But the US should still try to secure one.
Indeed, the role of the Security Council was explicitly mentioned in the World Summit’s backing of the responsibility-to-protect doctrine. If Washington fails, it could seek the support of the UN General Assembly — in which all countries have a vote and none has a veto.
Although this is not the normal way of getting authorisation for military action, Washington did use the so-called Uniting for Peace procedure in 1950 to get round the Russian veto and legitimise the Korean War. What’s more, the 2005 summit also mentioned the General Assembly’s responsibility to protect populations from crimes against humanity.
Apart from legitimacy, a proper UN debate and mandate might clarify what the world’s strategy is for combatting IS — something that is still unclear.
That, in turn, would increase the chance of success. REUTERS
