Views /Opinion

By Aaron David Miller

Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert once told me that all Israeli prime ministers sleep with one eye open. Israel is a tiny country in a dangerous neighbourhood. Worrying is a big part of the job description.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed serious concern about wily Iranian mullahs bearing gifts. So when he sat down with Barack Obama on Monday at the White House, was he worried that the president is planning to cut a deal with Iran at Israel’s expense?

No. Either there will be a very good deal that will take care of US and Israeli concerns on the nuclear issue, or there will be no deal. Why?

First, Obama worked hard to reset his relationship with Netanyahu and Israel this past year, so he isn’t going to undo the progress he’s made without a compelling purpose. Tensions with Israel during his first term not only brought zero benefits on foreign policy, but became gratuitously harmful, gave Republicans a chance to hammer him, and raised concerns within his party about his pro-Israel credentials. Given his domestic travails and the 2014 midterms, the last thing he wants or needs is a fight with Israel.

For another thing, in his address to the UN General Assembly, Obama identified two key foreign policy priorities in his second term: Iran and the Palestinians. 

Israel sits at the nexus of both. Managing, let alone resolving, those issues requires close understanding with Israel. If Obama is to have any hope of avoiding war with Iran on the nuclear issue, he will have to keep Israel close. And any chance that Secretary of State John Kerry may have to push the peace process forward depends on getting along with Netanyahu, not alienating him.

Then there is the fact that Hasan Rowhani isn’t Anwar Sadat. And Iran isn’t Egypt in 1977, suing for peace with Israel — or the US for that matter. The mullahs aren’t going to charm anyone for very long, let alone transform public attitudes in Israel or the US without significant and tangible deliverables. 

That’s not going to happen quickly or easily, given the withholding nature of the Supreme Leader, who may see benefits in keeping the US-Iranian relationship in managed tensions.

Finally, Obama can’t afford to be played the fool by Tehran. It’s true Iran plays three-dimensional chess in its foreign policy while we seem to play checkers. But the alert level on the Iranian charm offensive is high, and Obama is likely to be cautious and risk averse when it comes to the nuclear issue. There’s no issue that unites Congress like its mistrust of Iran. 

The administration would be hammered for showing signs of weakness without tangible and compelling concessions from Tehran. Obama has staked much of his personal credibility on stopping Iran from acquiring a weapon. He has a huge incentive to make a deal — but only if it can credibly accomplish that end.

Netanyahu faces challenges. But neither has much to do with  Obama. 

First, the prime minister confronts a tough and wily Iranian regime close to crossing the nuclear threshold but is probing to see whether it can get sanctions relief without giving up all of its nuclear gains. 

It’s far from certain that despite sanctions, the Supreme Leader is in any hurry to drop the programme’s military aspects without major concessions from the US. And then there’s Netanyahu — a man who can also be his own enemy when his suspicions and inflexibility get the better of him. 

Whether the Iranian charm offensive is a trap or an opportunity isn’t clear. But Israel needs a strong, confident, pragmatic hawk to deal with that dynamic — a leader who is suspicious of Iran’s opening, but who’s also open to a deal, to probing whether what Iran is selling is real, marketable, and profitable for both sides. 

Israel needs a leader who’s willing to trust and verify motives of its close ally and then, if an agreement makes sense, to concede what he must. 

If an agreement that ends the military aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme with comprehensive inspections is to be reached in return for dismantling of sanctions and Iran’s right to enrich uranium for civilian use, the Iranians, the Americans, and the Israelis will need to concede something significant. 

The art of diplomacy is having the courage, wisdom, boldness and prudence to determine whether the price you have to pay is worth what you’re getting in return. It’s a weighty decision, particularly when alternatives seem to be an Iran with a bomb or bombs over Iran.

WP-BLOOMBERG

By Aaron David Miller

Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert once told me that all Israeli prime ministers sleep with one eye open. Israel is a tiny country in a dangerous neighbourhood. Worrying is a big part of the job description.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed serious concern about wily Iranian mullahs bearing gifts. So when he sat down with Barack Obama on Monday at the White House, was he worried that the president is planning to cut a deal with Iran at Israel’s expense?

No. Either there will be a very good deal that will take care of US and Israeli concerns on the nuclear issue, or there will be no deal. Why?

First, Obama worked hard to reset his relationship with Netanyahu and Israel this past year, so he isn’t going to undo the progress he’s made without a compelling purpose. Tensions with Israel during his first term not only brought zero benefits on foreign policy, but became gratuitously harmful, gave Republicans a chance to hammer him, and raised concerns within his party about his pro-Israel credentials. Given his domestic travails and the 2014 midterms, the last thing he wants or needs is a fight with Israel.

For another thing, in his address to the UN General Assembly, Obama identified two key foreign policy priorities in his second term: Iran and the Palestinians. 

Israel sits at the nexus of both. Managing, let alone resolving, those issues requires close understanding with Israel. If Obama is to have any hope of avoiding war with Iran on the nuclear issue, he will have to keep Israel close. And any chance that Secretary of State John Kerry may have to push the peace process forward depends on getting along with Netanyahu, not alienating him.

Then there is the fact that Hasan Rowhani isn’t Anwar Sadat. And Iran isn’t Egypt in 1977, suing for peace with Israel — or the US for that matter. The mullahs aren’t going to charm anyone for very long, let alone transform public attitudes in Israel or the US without significant and tangible deliverables. 

That’s not going to happen quickly or easily, given the withholding nature of the Supreme Leader, who may see benefits in keeping the US-Iranian relationship in managed tensions.

Finally, Obama can’t afford to be played the fool by Tehran. It’s true Iran plays three-dimensional chess in its foreign policy while we seem to play checkers. But the alert level on the Iranian charm offensive is high, and Obama is likely to be cautious and risk averse when it comes to the nuclear issue. There’s no issue that unites Congress like its mistrust of Iran. 

The administration would be hammered for showing signs of weakness without tangible and compelling concessions from Tehran. Obama has staked much of his personal credibility on stopping Iran from acquiring a weapon. He has a huge incentive to make a deal — but only if it can credibly accomplish that end.

Netanyahu faces challenges. But neither has much to do with  Obama. 

First, the prime minister confronts a tough and wily Iranian regime close to crossing the nuclear threshold but is probing to see whether it can get sanctions relief without giving up all of its nuclear gains. 

It’s far from certain that despite sanctions, the Supreme Leader is in any hurry to drop the programme’s military aspects without major concessions from the US. And then there’s Netanyahu — a man who can also be his own enemy when his suspicions and inflexibility get the better of him. 

Whether the Iranian charm offensive is a trap or an opportunity isn’t clear. But Israel needs a strong, confident, pragmatic hawk to deal with that dynamic — a leader who is suspicious of Iran’s opening, but who’s also open to a deal, to probing whether what Iran is selling is real, marketable, and profitable for both sides. 

Israel needs a leader who’s willing to trust and verify motives of its close ally and then, if an agreement makes sense, to concede what he must. 

If an agreement that ends the military aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme with comprehensive inspections is to be reached in return for dismantling of sanctions and Iran’s right to enrich uranium for civilian use, the Iranians, the Americans, and the Israelis will need to concede something significant. 

The art of diplomacy is having the courage, wisdom, boldness and prudence to determine whether the price you have to pay is worth what you’re getting in return. It’s a weighty decision, particularly when alternatives seem to be an Iran with a bomb or bombs over Iran.

WP-BLOOMBERG